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Abstract 
 
Foreign market entry through equity investment has been extensively studied and various theoretical lenses have 
been used. Most previous research also focuses attention on either the entry mode selection decision or the topic 
of post-entry performance, but rarely both. We build on existing research by developing a model of foreign 
market entry and post-entry performance that uses network theory and organizational ecology to provide a fuller 
explanation of this complex and critical multinational enterprise strategic behaviour.  Four pairs of total eight 
propositions were developed and justified based on extent literature and sound logical reasoning. By focusing on 
both entry mode choice and the post-entry performance implications of these choices, we cover both sides of the 
logic of profit as a function of both costs and revenues.  Finally, potential managerial implications are discussed 
at the end. 
 
Key Words: Business performance, foreign entry mode, network, organization ecology, foreign entry 
performance, transaction cost economics 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A multinational enterprise (MNE) seeking to enter a new foreign market must make an important strategic 
decision on two related but distinct issues.  The first involves the choice between a non-equity entry mode such as 
exporting through agents and licensing and an equity-based entry mode in which the local enterprise is either 
partially owned or wholly owned. Second, if an equity mode of entry is selected, the issue of whether to acquire 
an existing firm (acquisition), collaborate with a local firm (joint venture) or establish a completely new plant has 
to be decided (Morschett, Schramm-Klein, & Swoboda, 2010). Our interest in this paper is limited to the choice 
of equity-based entry modes, defined as investment that involves ownership and confers effective management 
control (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992), of which there are four types: wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS), equity 
joint ventures (JVs), acquisitions and capital participation (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Woodcock, Beamish, & 
Makino, 1994; Yiu & Makino, 2002). 
 
While redundant for some, we feel it important at the beginning to define the terminology used throughout the 
paper. WOS reflects a start-up investment in new facilities. Joint venture refers to the pooling of assets in a 
common and separate organization by two or more firms who share joint ownership and control over the use and 
fruits of these assets. Acquisitions refer to the purchase of stock in an existing company in an amount sufficient to 
confer control (Kogut & Singh, 1991). Capital participation is a foreign entry made by the expansion of an 
existing domestic operation as funded by the foreign investor (Beamish, Delios, & Makino, 2001). Because 
capital participation has been less frequently used in practice and drawn little attention from researchers, in this 
paper, we will concentrate on the first three equity-based entry modes.Different equity ownership structures have 
different implications on their characteristics in terms of organizational control and resource commitments (Chang 
& Rosenzweig, 2001; Harzing, 2002; Morschett et al., 2010).  
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WOS offer the greatest control over the local affiliate, yet require the longest time for establishment and the 
greatest contribution of resources. JVs are a way to draw on the resources of a local partner and to minimize risk, 
but also raise sticky issues of managing relationships with partners whose interests may diverge over time. 
Acquisitions offer the fastest means of building a sizable presence in a foreign market, yet are fraught with risks 
of overpayment, inability to fully assess the value of acquired assets, and post acquisition challenges including 
cross-cultural integration (Chang et al., 2001). 
 
Numerous studies have investigated factors that might influence the choice for various entry modes(see Morschett 
et al., 2010 for a review). Most of these studies follow a transaction cost theory framework and focus on the 
economic factors that influence firms costs and benefits (e.g. Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; 
Chang et al., 2001; Chen & Hennart, 2002; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Lu, 2002; Makino & Neupert, 2000; 
Morschett et al., 2010; Papyrina, 2007; Theingi & Tang, 2007; Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004), while other studies have 
turned to factors that are less economically oriented (Brouthers, 2002; Chang et al., 2001; Davis, Desai, & 
Francis, 2000; Delios et al., 1999; Duanmu, 2011; Harzing, 2002; Li, Yang, & Yue, 2007; Lu, 2002; Luo & 
Shenkar, 2011; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005; Papyrina, 2007; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005; Yiu et al., 2002).  
This long stream of research has led to substantial agreement on factors that influence entry mode decisions. 
However, most of these studies separate entry mode selection from post entry performance, which might have less 
value to MNE managers who are primarily interested in performance more than anything else. In addition, these 
studies have not found a strong and consistent relationship between entry mode selection and post entry 
performance (Morschett et al., 2010).  
 
Our approach will go beyond transaction cost theory and institutional theory, drawing on both network theory and 
organizational ecology to develop a fuller model of the complex strategic behaviour of MNEs. We conceptualize 
an MNE’s entry into a new foreign market by equity investments as the founding of a new firm, which serves as a 
node connecting the MNE’s existing network with the external business network (social structure) in the host 
country. Forms of founding will have effects on, and be affected by, the ecological environment; types of nodes 
will have influences on, and be influenced by, the characteristics of networks being connected.  Because different 
equity entry modes represent different forms of founding and different types of nodes, the characteristics of MNE 
internal network and host country external network will influence entry mode selection and performance. 
 
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS 
 
Forms of subsidiary founding. As we discussed above, different entry modes represent different forms of 
founding of the new MNE subunit. To ensure that our conceptual ideas are shared by all, we provide the 
following analogies.  WOS are similar to a parent cloning itself and giving birth to a new baby. Joint ventures 
with a local partner are similar to marriage, resulting in the birth of a baby that has characteristics from both 
parents. Acquisition is similar to adoption in that an MNE finds an entity in the local country and transforms the 
adopted business into a new entity under the MNE umbrella. While similar to a domestically founded 
organization that would be exposed to the liabilities of newness and adolescence (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; 
Carroll & Hannan, 1989a; Stinchcombe, 1965), MNE subunits are born with two additional imprinting 
characteristics: 1) the liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1960/1976; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Zaheer, 1995); and 2) 
a strategic function within the current MNE network and a mission to connect the MNE with host business 
networks. The ultimate performance measure of these newly born subunits should be to counter the liabilities of 
newness, adolescence and foreignness, and survive the local environment to realize the parent MNE’s strategic 
goal. Based on these assumptions, we integrate entry mode selection directly with a subunits’ post-entry 
performance. Because a subunit’s primary function is to connect an MNE’s existing network with the host 
business network, we develop our argument from a network theory framework and revisit the conceptualizations 
of MNE.  
 
Characteristics of a network. The task of defining a network involves specifying the set of nodes and the 
relationships between them (Laumann, Glaskiewicz, & Marsden, 1978). Nodes, relationship and linkages are the 
basic elements of a network. In this paper, we characterize network along two dimensions: structural attributes, 
which focus on density of nodes and linkages, and content attributes, which are concerned with relationships and 
types of resource flows within the network. 
 
MNE as an interorganizational network. MNEs have long been regarded as a distinctive organizational form, 
with some researchers explaining their structure and attributes from the perspective of technical and economic  
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rationality (Beamish & Banks, 1987; Kogut, 1983) while others adopt a more social perspective (Bartlett, 1986; 
Westney, 1999). In this paper, we adopt a social and institutional view. The uniqueness of the MNE as an 
organizational form arises from the fact that its different constituent units are embedded in different national 
environments in which the structure of these relational networks can be, and often are, very different (Westney, 
1999) . This view is consist with the view of a “network organization” (Powell, 1990), which emerges from the 
importance of internal networks in the model of the “new organization”.  We conceptualize a multinational 
enterprise as a group of geographically dispersed and goal-disparate organizations which include its headquarters 
and the different national subsidiaries (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Lee, Lee, 
& Pennings, 2001). 
 
Internal network and external network. As detailed above, an MNE can be conceptualized as an 
interorganizational network that is embedded in an external network consisting of all other organizations such as 
customers, suppliers, and regulators, with which the different units of the multinational must interact. An 
ownership boundary can be drawn between an MNE’s internal and external networks. The internal network 
consists of MNE headquarters and its geographically dispersed country units that are bound by ownership ties. 
The external network consists of all other organizations and institutions, such as customers, suppliers, 
competitors, and regulators with which the MNE interacts.  A newly founded subsidiary, whether established 
through a WOS, a joint venture, or an acquisitions serves as a node that connects the MNE’s internal network 
with the external network in the host country. Therefore, selection of entry modes would be determined by the 
characteristics of internal MNE network and external networks. As discussed above, we focus on both structural 
and content network characteristics in developing our entry mode selection and performance model.  
 
Network Structural Attributes and Entry Mode Selection 
 
Network density is a key structural property that refers to the extent of interconnection among the actors of the 
network – the greater the interconnectedness, the higher the density (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Miller & 
Eden, 2006). That is, density measures the extent to which actors (nodes) within a network are connected, on 
average, to one another (i.e., the mean relation from any one actor to any other actor).  Previous research has 
defined linkage density as the percentage of actual to potential ties among members of a network (Abrahamson & 
Fombrun, 1994; Ghoshal et al., 1990; Gnyawali et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2006). In the same manner that we 
distinguish an MNE’s internal network from its external network, we can also distinguish a network’s structural 
attributes in terms of internal density and external density. Focusing on linkage density is theoretically appealing 
because the density of an interorganizational network is a good predictor of the structural homogeneity among 
nodes in a network. Abrahamson and Fombrun (1994) argued, “Greater density in an exchange network causes a 
denser network of interorganizational social ties through which ambiguity-reducing categorizations come to be 
shared more extensively, giving rise to a more homogeneous macroculture.”  In addition, density of linkages 
among key players influences industry performance and company strategy (Bower, 1987). After this brief 
clarification of our use of network terms, we now proceed to develop the causal relationships between internal and 
external network densities and the constructs of MNE entry mode selection and post-entry performance. 
 
Internal network density. MNEs with high internal density refer to situations where existing subsidiaries are 
closely and tightly connected. In such situations, headquarters often imposes controls on the various subunits, and 
also demands strong degrees of coordination among subunits. Such a high internal density situation results in 
close monitoring on the new subunits. In addition, because high internal density leads to increased homogeneity 
across the subunits of an internal MNE network, any new members in the network will be increasingly similar to 
other subunits.  This relatedness and homogeneity with the parent and other subunits does not equally affect the 
three different modes of entry. It seems plausible that internal developed subunits (wholly owned subsidiaries) 
would be more likely to be able to match the structural requirements of the parent firm and other units and thus 
merge into an existing internal MNE network than acquired businesses or joint ventures.  Relative to an acquired 
entity, WOS are usually a great deal more compatible with the parent firm in terms of culture, systems, and 
procedures. Moreover, because in a dense network managers leading the internally developed business are more 
likely to have work and social connections with their counterparts in other operating divisions of the firm, they are 
likely to more effectively draw upon relevant resources. In contrast, operations of acquired businesses or joint 
ventures are often disrupted as the new parent attempts to integrate them within the parent umbrella.  In addition, 
because of a lack of history between managers of the acquired business and new parent, it is also likely the 
theoretical benefits for the within network are hard to realize (Sharma, 1998).  
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Therefore, under a dense internal network, an MNE that chooses a WOS for market entry would be more likely to 
realize the benefits of close ties between the parent and existing subunits to get efficiency. Although an MNE 
could impose full control on a newly acquired firm, it will also incur costs in integrating the business into its 
current network. Therefore, acquisition as a foreign market entry mode choice should fall after that of a WOS.  
Because a joint venture involves new partners outside the current MNE network, the MNE has to share controls 
on the new subunit. It is harder to integrate a partially owned subunit into the network than one involving full 
control. On the contrary, if the internal linkages are not extensive, the requirements of structural similarity for 
new members will not as restrictive, and therefore a joint venture would make a logical choice.  The logic behind 
the importance of structural similarity is to improve post-entry performance. Under the contingency of a dense 
internal network, a WOS would perform better than an acquisition or joint venture. Formally, we offer the 
following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1a: Under a dense internal network, MNE will tend to choose WOS entry mode, followed by 
acquisition and joint venture mode.  
 
Proposition 1b: Other things being equal, under the conditions of a dense internal network, WOS will perform 
better than acquisitions and joint ventures. 
 
External network density. In establishing a new subsidiary in a host country, MNEs need to consider the 
external network density as well. The density of an MNE’s external network influences its foreign market entry 
choice in two ways: the associated difficulties in building new linkages with the existing local network, and the 
probability of retaliation from incumbents in the external network. In the host country, local networks that are 
tightly connected restrict an MNE’s access to the market due to their enduring patterns of repeat trading and 
persistent relationships. Opportunities are thus foreclosed to newcomers, either intentionally or more subtly 
through such barriers as unwritten rules or informal codes of conduct (Powell, 1990). Also, strong and 
multiplexed ties among existing members of the national organization sets will lead to exclusion from the sets of 
those who cannot establish equally strong and multiplexed ties with other members (Granovetter, 1985). Westney 
and Sakakibara’s (1985) study of the R&D activities of Japanese and American computer companies illustrates 
the constraining effects of external network density. Their study finds that Japanese R&D centers of some 
American computer companies were unable to tap into local skills and technologies because they lacked 
manufacturing and marketing activities, which effectively hindered the establishment of linkages with the local 
“knowledge networks” (Westney & Sakakibara, 1985).  
 
When it comes to entry mode choices, some entry modes are more likely to counter these network barriers than 
others. Because a WOS establishes a new unit outside the local network, it would be much more costly to 
establish linkages with a vast number of nodes. If an MNE enters a target market by acquiring a current node in 
that network (acquiring a local firm), it will acquire the linkages attached to the acquired firm, therefore becoming 
one of the nodes in the existing local network. Similarly with a joint venture partner, the linkages attached to the 
local partner would be shared with the new subunits.  
 
Another big issue for new entrants to a dense external network is the possible retaliation from incumbents. 
Incumbent reaction to new entry may depend on how the cost of retaliation is shared among them. The incumbent 
that retaliates against an entrant incurs private costs in taking actions unilaterally. If the entrant is eventually 
forced to exit, the benefits accrue to all incumbents (Sharma, 1998). Since dense networks function as “closed” 
systems, trust, shared norms, and common behavior patterns develop more easily. It also facilitates effective 
sanctions. The threat of sanctions is more likely and more effective from a dense external network since the 
reputation effects of sanctions are amplified (Gnyawali et al., 2001; Granovetter, 1985). With coordinated 
incumbent strategies, new entrants to a dense network will be more likely to face retaliation. However, different 
ways of connecting to this dense network might encounter different degrees of retaliation. Because a WOS as a 
completely new unit to an existing host network, incumbents would be more likely to retaliate. Because 
acquisitions involve the replacement of one of the current market players, it will not likely be viewed as such a 
threat to incumbents in terms of resource exchanges and ties. As a result, an acquisition is less likely to spark 
retaliation from current market incumbents. Joint ventures likely fall somewhere between these two situations, 
with the degree of incumbent retaliation at least partially a function of how the local partner relates to that 
network. 
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Because acquisitions and joint ventures are less likely to face retaliation and also easier to establish linkages and 
connect to the existing host network, we expect that acquisition or joint venture entry modes, under dense external 
networks, will perform better than WOS. Stated formally, we offer the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2a: To facilitate connecting to a dense external network, MNEs will tend to choose acquisition or 
joint venture entry modes rather than WOS.  
 
Proposition 2b: Other things being equal, under conditions of high external network density, acquisitions or joint 
ventures will perform better than WOS. 
 
Network Content Attributes and Entry Mode Selection.  Linkages and nodes only represent the structural 
characteristics of a network (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Organizations 
do not establish linkages just for the sake of building a network, but rather to exchange resources. The resources 
flows within the network define the content attribute of a network. We conceptualize that entering a foreign 
market is analogous to founding a new firm, which will face the liabilities of newness and adolescence (Bruderl et 
al., 1990; Carroll et al., 1989a; Stinchcombe, 1965). Additionally, MNE subunits will also face the liability of 
foreignness (Hymer, 1960/1976; Kostova et al., 1999; Zaheer, 1995).  Therefore, the immediate goal of these 
newly born subunits should be to counter the liabilities of newness, adolescence and foreignness, allowing the 
subunit to realize the parent MNE’s strategic goals in the new market. Different entry modes will affect a 
subunits’ ability to counter these liabilities.  Resource availability from the internal and external network is the 
key determinant of success during this founding process. As an analogy, a baby is usually born with initial stock 
of resources from its parents (internal network), which sustains the baby until the age that it can support itself by 
acquiring resources from its environment (external network). Therefore the mode used to connect the internal 
network and external network should be influenced by the content attributes of these two networks (i.e., the 
resource availability of network). Below, we examine the availability of internal and external resources 
respectively and their influence on MNE foreign entry mode selection. 
 
Internal Network Resource Availability. The liability of newness refers to the propensity of younger 
organizations to have higher failure rates than older organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965). Organizational failure 
rates decline with age as roles and routines are mastered and links with external constituents are established, and 
the liability of newness is a cornerstone of the age dependence elements of organizational ecology (Freeman, 
Carroll, & Hannan, 1983).   Young organizations are more vulnerable because they have to learn new roles as 
social actors and create organizational roles and routines at a time when organizational resources are stretched to 
the limit. Selection pressures favor organizations with high reproducibility, which is often lacking in young or 
new organizations (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). All new organizations start with an 
initial stock of assets that buffer them from failure during an initial “honeymoon period.” The larger the initial 
stock of assets, the longer the period in which the organization is buffered. As the original stock of assets is 
depleted, organizations face increasing pressures from a liability of adolescence (Bruderl et al., 1990); and those 
organizations that are unable to establish necessary roles and routines or develop stable relationships with 
important external constituents are more likely to fail. Regarding a new MNE subunit, two categories of resources 
are critically important: transferable routines from the MNE’s internal network and financial resource 
commitments from the MNE’s internal network.  
 
Routines are the genes and processes that the MNE follows in its operations. An MNE entering new foreign 
markets will often transfer routines to its new subsidiary, but often these organization-level routines are not 
necessarily applicable in the local environment. In terms of usefulness to newly established subunits, routines can 
be grouped into three categories: readily transferable routines, non-transferable routines, and localizable routines.  
Transferable routines are those that can be easily transferred to a subsidiary without local modifications.  
Localizable routines are those that can be transferred, but must be modified to accommodate local market 
requirements. Nontransferable routines are those that cannot be transferred or modified to fit the local 
environment. Available routines from an MNE’s internal network do not necessarily originate from MNE 
headquarters, but can also emerge from other subunits within the MNE network as well.  The existing profile of 
MNE routines will influence an MNE’s choice of entry mode when entering a foreign market.   Initial contributed 
financial resources are the energy needed to transfer parent routines into the new subsidiary or the currency 
needed to acquire routines from other parties. Thus, financial resources would be another important determinant 
of the degree of newness and adolescence.   
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WOS is the entry mode choice that basically clones the parent firm into the local market, bringing with it the 
parent’s routines and roles. It also requires the parent firm’s financial resources to facilitate the process of 
transferring these routine fluently. Given a parent firm’s sufficient financial resources and available routines, it 
would face less liability of newness and adolescence and increase its survival chances with a WOS entry mode.  
As a foreign market entry mode, joint ventures often require the MNE to modify its routines by collaborating with 
a local firm. Through this process, the routines and practices that emerge in a joint venture take on local market 
characteristics. The key factor is to find the right partner to transform routines, and to use pooled financial 
resources (with local partner) to make the newly established routines work well. Joint ventures therefore need 
moderate financial resources and localizable routines from the parent MNE. Entry through acquisition often uses 
the parent firm’s financial resources to pull the locally available routines into the MNE umbrella. In this case, 
parent MNEs usually have few transferable routines, but have enough compensating financial resources to acquire 
these routines and make them match the MNE’s structure.   
 
MNEs facing such contingencies would fare better by choosing the right mode to enter the target market.  When 
such decisions are based on the transferability of current routines and the availability of financial resources, the 
MNE subunits have stronger means of countering the liabilities of newness and adolescence, therefore the 
selected entry mode with this perspective will perform better than otherwise with other things being equal. Pulling 
these thoughts together formally leads to the following propositions:  
 
Proposition 3a: MNEs that have readily transferable routines and financial resources tend to choose 
WOS; MNEs that have localizable routines and moderate financial resources tend to choose joint 
ventures; MNEs that have few transferable routines but with sufficient financial resources tend to choose 
acquisitions. 
 
Proposition 3b: Entry mode selected on this contingency logic will perform better than those that do not 
follow these contingencies.   
 
External Network Resource Availability. Richness of initial stock of assets involves the internal commitment of 
the parent MNE, but selection of entry modes is also influenced by the availability of external resources. The 
constraining external factors set the extent to which internal assets can contribute to the performance of the MNE. 
Founded in a host country, an MNE subsidiary becomes a new member in the host country population. Local 
population density (nodes density) will affect the external resources available to the new subunit and thus 
influence its survival and growth. Firms are particularly sensitive to density at the time of founding (Carroll et al., 
1989a), which is consistent with Stinchcombe’s (1965) well-established argument regarding the imprinting of 
conditions of founding. Intense competition at time of founding (due to high density) creates conditions of 
resource scarcity, and when resources are scarce new organizations that cannot move quickly from start-up to full 
scale operations face very strong selection pressures (Carroll et al., 1989a). 
 
A second consequence of high nodes density at time of founding concerns “tight niche packing.” When density is 
high, resources are subject to intense exploitation, and few resources go unexploited. Since newly founded 
organizations can seldom compete head-to-head with established organizations, the new entrants tend to be 
pushed to the margins of the resource space. Tight niche packing thus causes new organizations to attempt to 
exploit thinly spread and ephemeral resources. Even if they succeed at creating structures and routines for 
adapting successfully to the inferior regions of the resource space, in the course of doing so they commit 
themselves to persisting at the margins. The specialized learning of staff, the collective experience of the 
organization, and the organization’s connections with the environment all become specialized to exploiting the 
inferior regions of the environment. Attempting to shift toward the richer center at some later time entails high 
risks of mortality during periods of protracted reorganization. If the reorganization is successful, it brings the 
organization into competition with others specialized in exploiting the center. In either case, these marginal 
organizations have higher than average mortality rates.  
 
The third consequence is that in a highly concentrated markets, incumbents are more likely to retaliate against 
entrants (Bunch & Smiley, 1992). Therefore, firms founded in high density environments will face even tougher 
challenges. In a study of chemical processing industries, Lieberman found that incumbents coordinated 
investments in concentrated industries in response to entry but not when other incumbents expanded their 
capacities (Lieberman, 1987). 
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With respect to MNE entry mode selection, different entry modes have different implications on the resource 
scarcity of local networks due to population (nodes) density. The possibility of retaliation by incumbents will also 
have varied effects on different entry modes. WOS, by definition as the founding of a completely new firm, will 
increase the intensity of competition. At periods of high density, with the local network occupying the central 
domain of resources distributions, a WOS would likely be positioned at the periphery of the resource space. As 
such, a WOS will likely face higher selection pressures than entry accomplished through acquisition. On the 
contrary, by acquiring an existing firm in a tightly packed resource space, the entering firm could position itself 
into the central domain of the resource distribution in the local environment. Therefore, the adverse imprinting 
effects of founding when density is high would less be less influential for a subunit entering a market through 
acquisition. Although the founding of a joint ventures might make resources more scarce, and intensify 
competition for the local network as the local partner of the JV might possess some centrally located resources, 
the adverse effects of the liability of resource scarcity and tight niche-packing would be less severe to JVs than to 
WOS, but worse for JVs than to acquisitions.  In terms of performance as related to selecting the correct entry 
mode in light of local market density, the performance of acquisitions in a high-density environment will be better 
than WOS and joint ventures. Stated formally, we present the following propositions:. 
 
Proposition 4a. In a local network exhibiting high density (low availability of external resources), foreign market 
entry through acquisition will be preferred to joint ventures and WOS.  
 
Proposition 4b. In a high-density host country network (low availability of external resources), with other things 
being equal, entry through acquisition will exhibit a lower chance of mortality than joint ventures and WOS. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this paper, we extend the network-based MNE theory into the equity-based entry mode selection area through 
the integrated view of entry mode selection and post entry performance. As transaction cost theory has been 
dominantly adopted to explain MNE’s foreign market entry behavior and research has not found a consistent 
relationship between entry mode selection and post-entry performance, the network-based perspective we have 
developed provides a constructive “next step” into this interesting area.  The various propositions we have 
developed within this paper are summarized in Figure 2, detailing the influences of both internal and external 
networks on a firm’s entry mode choice and post-entry performance.     We also tried to integrate elements of 
organizational ecology into the inter-organizational network theory framework in order to provide a fuller 
acknowledgement of the social structure in which MNE subunits must compete. Both theories stress the 
importance of density concepts, yet use density to measure different things. Organizational ecology is concerned 
with the number of organizations in a population, while interorganizational theory is interested in the density of 
linkages among organizations and between organizations and their external network. Under a network theory 
framework, we would regard organizations in a population as nodes in an inter-organizational network. Both 
nodes and linkages are essential structural properties of a network. Combining density of nodes and linkages will 
give us clearer picture of the network structures and lead us to further exploration on the dynamics of business 
networks.  
 
Third, many studies have examined the effects of a network’s structural attributes on its content or relational 
attributes (Abrahamson et al., 1994; Ghoshal et al., 1990; Gnyawali et al., 2001; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). 
Most of these researchers examined the effects of network density on resource configurations and the degree of 
embeddedness of a network. These efforts mostly focus on density of linkages, leaving density of nodes 
unexplored. Organizational ecology provides complements to this gap, which we explicitly address. Density of 
nodes has substantial influences on the resource distributions within a network and the survival odds of individual 
nodes within the network. It is especially useful in explaining the dynamic evolution of a network, the founding of 
new nodes, and the dissolution of failed nodes.  We propose a first step in this direction, hopefully shedding light 
on the foreign market entry mode selection of an MNE network. Our theory on an integrated entry mode selection 
and post-entry performance model has practical implications for managers as well. In terms of entry mode 
selection, a manager’s primary concern is post-entry performance. Our network based entry mode selection model 
acknowledges post-entry performance as a primary concern, providing managers direct assistance with their entry 
mode decisions.  In addition, our network based entry mode selection model is embedded with a dynamic 
perspective.  
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By simultaneously examining characteristics of an MNE’s internal network, which is going to expand to host 
country, and that of its external network, to which it is going to connect, MNE managers will make better 
decisions regarding their entry mode selections and increases their chances for superior post-entry performance. 
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Figure 1: Integrated entry mode selection matrix 
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Figure 2. The network-based entry mode selection model and performance 
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